In recent years, policymakers have changed their approach to regulating financially-motivated cybercrime. Instead of pursuing individual bad actors, new policies seek to alter the structural relationships in cybercrime by regulating intermediaries used by computer criminals. These include: financial disincentives, financial account closures, asset seizers and blacklisting individuals from interacting with financial institutions. We seek to perform an exploratory investigation of key questions regarding these new methods of deterring cyber criminals, such as: What intermediary-regulation approaches have been taken by policymakers and how do they differ? How effective are these policies? What pitfalls might they have in terms of collateral damage? How might we improve these policies to have adequate oversight? In summary, this project seeks to undertake an exploratory investigation to understand the feasibility of identifying effective policies that will serve as strong deterrents to financially-motivated cyber criminals without unduly impacting companies and individuals not involved in cyber criminal activities.