Keywords:  Security Engineering and Design, Public Policy, Infrastructure,

2017

When to Avoid Digital Control: A Cybersecurity Case Study for Advanced Nuclear Reactors

Per Peterson, Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, UC Berkeley
Michael Nacht, Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley
Charalampos Andreades, Postdoctoral Researcher|Power Conversion Design Engineer, Department of Nuclear Engineering, UC Berkeley|Kairos Power

This team proposes to identify and study the major issues associated with design of the interface between digital control for normal operation of nuclear reactors, where digital control may be unreliable or even create control feedback that is deliberately unsafe (e.g. cyberattacks), and passively safe reactor designs, where disconnecting digital control can render the facility safe. This project will create a forum to discuss what the limits of digital control should be, and where critical infrastructure should be designed to function appropriately by intrinsic or analog feedback, independent of digital control.